Tackling E-Discovery Under a New Set of Rules
Significant changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding document production recently to went into effect in December 2006. The new Rules are designed to tackle - but do not resolve - complex technological and logistical issues surrounding electronic discovery, production and preservation. Because electronic information is voluminous and highly perishable, the new Rules require parties to "meet and confer" to resolve issues unique to electronic discovery early in litigation. The Rule 26(f) planning conference must now include discussion regarding:
1. Issues related to the disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information that may be unique to the parties involved, including the parties' storage methods and automatic deletion systems;
2. The format of production (e.g. TIF, PDF, native format, paper/hard copies);
3. The costs of production (including costs of imaging and recovery where applicable);
4. How dynamic electronic information will be preserved; and
5. How the parties will deal with inadvertent production and potential waiver of privilege issues. That is, where a case involves voluminous electronic document production will the parties or even the court respect a "clawback" agreement that permits the producing party to reassert a privilege even where the document was produced?
These issues are not easily resolved and require plenty of early planning and strategy, as illustrated by a few examples. For example, if documents are to be produced in their electronic form, must the parties also produce metadata? (Metadata is background information in a document or file. For example, metadata can trace the recipients and senders of e-mails. It can also pinpoint all changes that have been made to documents such as Word documents.) By way of another example, how will the parties determine the format of production? That is, must documents be produced in native format rather than TIFs or PDFs? (Native documents are the documents in their changeable, "working form;" for example, an Excel spreadsheet produced in native will permit the opposing party to view or change formulas). If documents are produced in native format, how will the parties ensure the documents retain their originally-produced format? Other tough issues include addressing a time frame that is practical to preserve electronic documents considering any effect it will have on the parties' day-to-day business operations.
These are just a few of the many types of questions that must be addressed by both sides at the outset of litigation. For this reason, attorneys need the immediate cooperation and active assistance of a corporate client to identify the appropriate IT/IS personnel to educate the attorney about the computer system and to aid in determining whether a system of automatic deletion needs to be halted to avoid penalties down the road. The client should also aid the attorney in designating a "30(b) (6) person" in the IS/IT department who will ultimately certify that all electronic documents sought are being produced.
The new Federal Rules press parties to resolve these issues earlier rather than later to ensure electronic evidence is preserved. The new Rules and the rise of judicial awareness evidenced by increasingly common award of sanctions related to "ediscovery" have one theme in common: the "empty head" defense of the technologically inept will be an invalid excuse in the face of a spoliation accusation.
The now infamous Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) case and other opinions sanctioning corporations and law firms provide a sobering view of the gravity of this issue. By way of introduction, the Court in Zubulake began its opinion by emphasizing the importance of good attorney-client communication, stating, "What is true in love is equally true at law: Lawyers and their clients need to communicate clearly and effectively with one another to ensure that litigation proceeds efficiently. When communication between counsel and client breaks down, conversation becomes 'just crossfire,' and there are usually casualties." Zubulake is one such casualty.
Zubulake involved a fairly routine, gender discrimination claim against an employer. Back-up documents, including relevant e-mails, were destroyed even though the company's attorney had asked the client and appropriate employees to produce and preserve all emails and relevant materials. The Zubulake Court imposed various monetary sanctions, penalties and costs, including costs of redeposing several witnesses. Worse still, the Court drafted an adverse jury instruction advising that the jury could infer that the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the employer!
Zubulake indicates unequivocally that a client must not only cease destroying or deleting e-mails and "e-documents" whenever there is a "possibility of litigation," but must take active, affirmative steps to ensure the same, including efforts to halt even automatic, unintentional deletion. To avoid a similarly disastrous "Zubulake situation," it is critical for the client to aid the attorney in understanding a client's automatic deletion and backup systems. To do so, the client and attorney must consider all the places where relevant electronic data might be stored including e-mail servers, hard drives, loose files, backup tapes, laptops, floppy discs, CDs, directories, PDAs, cell phones, Blackberries, and even employees' home desktops, if necessary.
While the burden may seem onerous, failing to investigate these possible sources of electronic information can be costly. In GTFM, Inc. v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc. , Doc. 98CIV.7724(RPP), 2000 WL 1693615 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 9, 2000), Wal-Mart was penalized because a senior executive reported that sales data the plaintiff requested was unavailable. It was later discovered from an "IS" (Information Systems) employee that the information would have been available at the time the plaintiff's request had been made but had since been overwritten. The court imposed sanctions including all plaintiff's expenses and legal fees (to the tune of $110,000) caused by the inaccurate disclosure. The court also imposed an on-site inspection of the computer facilities at Wal-Mart's expense.
The moral of the story? "Beware!" While the new Federal Rules raise important questions about electronic discovery, they will leave to the parties the difficult and tricky work of tackling the logistics. Early attorney-client communication to ensure a thorough exploration of a client's computer systems is now more critical than ever.
By: Renee A. Eveland
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Employment Agreement Covenants Not to Compete
Employment agreement covenants not to compete can limit a former employee's ability to solicit customers or clients of his or her former employer during and after the term of his or her employment. Such covenants, when properly drafted, can be effective tools for retaining clients and customers after the termination of an employment relationship. Many employers understand the importance of including covenants not to compete in their employment agreements. Such covenants are a virtual necessity in any employment relationship where employees have a significant amount of contact or interaction with the employer's customers or clients. This is especially true when dealing with employees working in a sales or marketing capacity. Fortunately, the Nebraska Courts have acknowledged the need of employers to protect the goodwill and client relationships developed by an employee for the employer during the term of his or her employment, and have permitted some contractual means of protecting those assets.
Generally, a covenant not to compete will be enforceable only to the extent that it is reasonable with respect to its duration and scope, and no greater than necessary to achieve its legitimate purpose. H&R Block Tax Services v. Circle A Enterprises, Inc., 269 Neb. 411, 693 N.W.2d 548 (2005). In the employment context, the validity of a covenant not to compete aimed at preventing a former employee from unfairly appropriating customer good will is no greater than reasonably necessary "only if it restricts the former employee from working for or soliciting the former employer's clients or accounts with whom the former employee actually did business and had personal contact." Id. at 418, 693 at 554.
Recent Nebraska Court of Appeals case law involving an employee of a staffing service indicated that a covenant not to compete was reasonable and enforceable where the covenant prevented the former employee from contacting or soliciting clients of her former employer, with whom the former employee had personal contact during the term of her employment, for a period of one year after the termination of her employment. C&L Industries, Inc. v. Kiviranta, 13 Neb.App. 604, 698 N.W.2d 240 (2005). Because these limitations have been acknowledged as reasonable in at least one context, they can serve as effective benchmarks for employers seeking to establish effective and enforceable non-competition policies for their own employees. More restrictive terms may be enforceable if they are necessary to protect a legitimate employer interest. It must be noted, however, that the Nebraska Courts have repeated indicated that they will not reform overly broad covenants not to compete. See Id. This effectively means that, a covenant not to compete that is too broad in terms of length, prohibited contacts or geographic scope may be held entirely unenforceable by a court, leaving an employer with no means of protecting itself from the competition of a former employee.
In May of 2006, an unpublished opinion of the Nebraska Court of Appeals was issued which appears to further complicate the process of properly drafting a covenant not to compete. The Court determined that multiple separate covenants not to compete would be read as one single covenant for purposes of determining enforceability, despite the inclusion of a severability provision in the agreement. The Court found that the merged covenant was unenforceable as the terms of one of the provisions was unenforceable, despite the fact that the terms of the other provision may have been acceptable if it had been the sole non-compete provision in the agreement. This recent ruling could potentially limit the effectiveness of artfully drafted employment agreements that contain multiple provisions limiting competition. In light of the recent rulings, employers seeking to utilize employment agreements that contain covenants not to compete should reexamine their agreements to ascertain whether the recent decisions will adversely affect the enforceability of the covenants. Fortunately, in the event a change to an employment agreement is necessary, a new covenant not to compete may be executed at almost any time in consideration of the employee's continued employment.
By: Daniel R. Slaughter
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Is Your Business Prepared to Handle an Employee's Request for Leave Under the FMLA?
Fulton County, Georgia was not prepared to handle Ralph Cooper's request for FMLA ( Family Medical Leave Act of 1993) leave on July 13, 1998. In the case of Cooper v. Fulton County, 2006 WL 2242727 (11th Cir. 2006), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Ralph Cooper and the damages awarded to Cooper in the amount of $248,828.41 in back pay and $58,031.59 in pension contributions and liquidated damages for violation of Cooper's rights under the FMLA. The mistakes made by Fulton County were technical in nature and serve as a lesson to employers on the costs of mishandling FMLA leave requests.
Cooper was an employee of Fulton County for nearly twenty years. On June 22, 1998, Cooper went to the hospital complaining of chest pains. He did not report to work that day or for several days thereafter. On July 6, 1998, the County Court Administrator had a letter hand delivered to Cooper advising him that the County policy required an original signed doctor's excuse for each day of his continued absence. Cooper was also informed that if he did not return to work or provide the required doctor's excuse by July 8, 1998, he would declare Cooper's position abandoned. On July 8, 1998, Cooper provided certificates from a medical clinic which accounted for his absences and stated he could return to work on July 13, 1998. On July 13, 1998, Cooper returned to work but after two hours he reported to his supervisor that he was too ill to work. On July 14, 1998, Cooper requested FMLA leave due to blurred vision, extreme headaches and "passing out." Two phone calls were made by Cooper's supervisor requesting a written medical excuse. Cooper did not respond. On August 4, 1998 Cooper was hand delivered another letter from the County Court Administrator instructing him to provide medical certification for his absence by August 10, 1998. Cooper failed to do so and his employment was terminated on August 10, 1998.
FMLA entitles eligible employees to take up to twelve (12) workweeks of leave during any twelve month period because of a "serious health condition" of the employee, for the birth or adoption of a child, and/or to take care of a child, spouse, or parent with a serious health condition. Implementing regulations require employers to furnish employees with written guidance about their rights and obligations under the statutes, as well as written guidance about the employer's specific policies relative to FMLA leave. 29 CFR § 825.301. Employers may require that employees furnish medical certification to verify eligibility for leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a). Employers must provided written guidance to employees of their rights and obligations under the FMLA; notice of the medical certification requirement, if one exists, and of the anticipated consequences for failing to comply with providing medical certification, every time an employee requests FMLA leave. Such notice must be written unless the employee has within the preceding six months been given the written notice. Otherwise oral notification is sufficient. When the leave is unforeseeable employers must allow employees at least fifteen (15) calendar days to comply with a request for medical certification. 29 CFR § 825.305(b). An employer who fails to give the required written notices cannot take adverse action against employees for failing to comply with any provision that is required to be included in the notice. An employee does not have to mention the FMLA or expressly assert rights under the FMLA to invoke its protection.
Fulton County violated Cooper's rights under the FMLA as follows: (1) Failing to allow Cooper the necessary 15 days to submit medical certification when it requested the medical certification on August 4, 1998, because the leave was unforeseeable; (2) Failing to inform Cooper in writing about the consequence of his failure to provide the requested medical certification; and (3) Failing to provide Cooper with any guidance on his rights and obligations under the FMLA.
The following is a more complete list of points that should be addressed in the written notice an employer gives to an employee after he or she makes a request for FMLA leave:
1. The leave will be counted against the employee's annual FMLA entitlement.;
2. Whether a medical certification will be required, the necessary time to submit it, and the consequences of failing to do so;
3. The employee's right to substitute paid leave and whether the employer will require paid leave to be substituted for FMLA leave and the requirements for any such substitution;
4. Requirements for employee payment of the employee's share of health insurance premiums, arrangements for making such payments, and consequences for failing to make timely payments;
5. Whether the employee will be required to provide a fitness for duty certificate prior to being restored to employment;
6. Whether the employee is considered a key employee and if so, the potential that he or she may be denied restoration and the conditions for such restoration to be denied;
7. The employee's right to job restoration to the same or to an equivalent job upon return from leave; and
8. The employee's potential liability for the employer's share of health insurance premium payments made by the employer during unpaid FMLA leave if the employee fails to return from FMLA leave.
There is a prototype for this notice available from the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor for the employer's written response, and it may be found at http://www.dol.gov/esa/forms/whd/WH-381.pdf, or by making a request to Wage and Hour Division.
Liquidated damages are awarded presumptively to an employee when an employer violates the FMLA unless the employer demonstrates its violation was in good faith and it had a reasonable basis for believing that its conduct was not in violation of the FMLA. Liquidated damages are equal to the wages lost, benefits, and interest. In Cooper v. Fulton County the court affirmed the award of liquidated damages. The court agreed with the district court's ruling that Fulton County had acted in good faith, but Fulton County did not have a reasonable basis for believing that its conduct was compliant with the FMLA. Neither the County Court Administrator nor Fulton County Personnel Director had read the FMLA statutes or regulations, consulted with an attorney, or contacted the U.S. Department of Labor.
If you have any questions about FMLA leave requests, please contact us.
By: Melanie Whittamore-Mantzios
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Internet and Catalogue Sales: the Streamlines Sales and Use Tax Agreement
In 1991, North Dakota requested Quill Corporation, a mail order company with no buildings or sales representatives in North Dakota, collect and remit a state use tax. Following litigation, the Supreme Court explained in Quill Corp v. North Dakota (1992) how the Due Process Clause centers on fundamental fairness to individuals, while the Commerce Clause concerns the consequences of state legislation on the national economy. Applying the principles of the Due Process Clause, a state may only tax entities over which it has jurisdiction, and a state's jurisdiction exists if a business has "minimum contacts." Yet, even if a state has jurisdiction, a state tax law may place an undue burden on interstate commerce thus violating the Commerce Clause, as with Quill Corporation.
In 1977, the Supreme Court in Complete Auto Inc. v. Brady established tests to determine whether a state tax law unduly burdens interstate commerce. State tax laws must "(1) be applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) be fairly apportioned, (3) not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) be fairly related to the services provided by the state." Remote vendors generally do not have the physical presence required to meet a "substantial nexus" test, so states cannot require the collection of sales or use taxes. Still, some vendors, such as Target and Wal- Mart, voluntarily collect state taxes. As long as the retail stores and online division are distinct corporate entities, online sales will not be subject to most states' taxes because the online division probably does not have a substantial nexus in many states. Keeping the entities separate can be difficult, which is partly why Wal-Mart and Target's online divisions collect applicable state taxes.
In a related 2005 case, Borders Online paid $167,667.78 in taxes to California and promptly asked for a refund since the company has no substantial nexus in California. The California Court of Appeals held in Borders Online, LLC v. State Bd. of Equalization that Borders Online was subject to California's use tax based on its connections with the Borders retail stores in California. Basically, customers were able to return online purchases at the retail stores and other crosspromotional activities of the Borders' brand existed. While companies might be able to make the separation between retail and online divisions distinct so online divisions can avoid state taxation, most businesses prefer to promote an overall brand.
Other vendors collect state taxes because they consider such taxation inevitable or to comply with the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement ("SSUTA"). Since 2000, forty-four states and the District of Columbia have been negotiating a comprehensive system for collecting sales and use taxes on remote transactions. Currently, there are thirteen full member states (Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and West Virginia) in compliance with the SSUTA. (Updated information is available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/govbrdstates.htm ) The SSUTA is developing software that will automatically calculate taxes for any jurisdiction, which would eliminate some of the burden for vendors whose sales cross into multiple states.
The SSUTA has other advantages for businesses that choose to comply in full member and associate member (Arkansas, Nevada, Ohio, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming) states by following one of the three models for collecting taxes. According to Brian Krebs's July 2005 article, States Move Forward on Internet Sales Tax, in the Washington Post, "As an incentive, the states will offer a one-year amnesty for e-commerce companies that may owe taxes on past online sales to any of the participating states. The amnesty offer could prove attractive for several major retailers that are currently involved in legal disputes over whether they owe taxes on Internet sales." To be granted amnesty, the retailer must comply with the SSUTA within twelve months of a state's SSUTA adoption. Also, retailers do not collect taxes in associate member states unless otherwise required by law.
Some Internet retailers are not enthusiastic about the SSUTA because questions remain regarding how states will compensate retailers for collecting and remitting taxes and how digital downloads of books, music, software, and movies will be handled. Furthermore, some states, such as Colorado, have exceptionally complicated tax systems that will require extensive simplification. Some of the fortyplus states that initially participated are unwilling to start the process of tax simplification until Congress signals support, but while bills related to the SSUTA were introduced in 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2006, none have gone to the Senate or House floor for a vote.
Until Congress enacts legislation embracing the SSUTA or the Supreme Court overturns Quill, remote vendors cannot be forced to collect sales or use taxes from consumers unless the vendor has a substantial nexus within the taxing jurisdiction. Nevertheless, since Nebraska is a full member participating in the SSUTA and tax laws are likely to change due to the increasing popularity of Internet shopping, remote vendors with Internet or catalog sales should move toward collecting state sales taxes. This may become especially important as some states consider making companies liable for back taxes on remote sales.
By: Jennifer Bogerding
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A Written Settlement Offer is Not an Offer to Confess Judgment
For those of you involved in litigation, you are probably aware that Nebraska law allows defendants to confess judgment, thereby mitigating the amount of costs they have to pay after a judgment is entered. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-901, if a defendant offers in writing to allow judgment to be taken against him for a specified sum, and if the plaintiff rejects the offer and then fails to recover a judgment for more than the amount of the offer to confess, the defendant does not have to pay any of the plaintiff's costs incurred after the offer was made. Furthermore, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25- 906, a plaintiff who fails to recover more than the offer can be required to pay the defendant's costs incurred after the date of the offer.
Recently, the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed whether a written settlement offer is an "offer to confess" for purposes of § 25-901. In Young v. Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co., the Youngs brought suit against their homeowner insurance carrier. During the litigation, the carrier sent several letters to the Youngs offering to settle their claim, including an initial offer of $22,000.00. The Youngs refused each offer and ultimately received a jury verdict in the amount of $940, well below any of the offers from the carrier.
The Youngs moved for attorney's fees under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-359, which permits a party who obtains a judgment against his insurer to recover attorney's fees if the judgment is more than the carrier has offered to confess under Section 25-901. The Douglas County District Court denied the Youngs request, stating that §25-901 precluded an award of attorney's fees because they failed to obtain more at trial than the carrier offered in settlement.
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed. It found that under the plain language of § 25-901, an "offer to confess" must offer to allow judgment to be taken against the defendant. Since the written settlement offers sent to the Youngs did not offer to allow judgment to be taken against the carrier, they were not "offers to confess" for purposes of the statute. Therefore, the Youngs were entitled to recover their attorney's fees.
If you are involved in the handling or oversight of defense litigation files, remember that offers to confess judgment are an effective tool available to you and can serve a number of important purposes. First, in the wake of unsuccessful informal settlement discussions, the opposing party may believe there is still room for you to move in your settlement offers. Therefore, she may not give your best offer due consideration. By filing an offer to confess judgment, you can communicate to the opposing party that you are resolute in your evaluation of his or her claim. Second, along similar lines, your offer to confess judgment can have a very sobering effect on the plaintiff, especially one who has attached an over inflated value to his claim. In the face of an offer to confess judgment, the plaintiff must give serious consideration to the fact that he could be ordered to pay the defendant's costs if he fails to get a verdict for a greater amount than the offer to confess. In more complex cases, these costs could be substantial. Third, the offer to confess judgment allows you to minimize your exposure for paying the opposing party's costs. Finally, there are no negative repercussions in filing the offer. Offers can be made any time prior to trial. Once it is made, the plaintiff only has five days to respond. If the offer is not accepted, it is deemed rejected under the statute and the opposing party may not reference it or introduce it into evidence at the time of trial.
So the next time you are evaluating a file, determine whether an offer to confess judgment is appropriate under the circumstances. If so, get one filed with the court. In the end, you have nothing to lose and everything to gain, including saving yourself the expense of defending needlessly protracted litigation.
By: Cathy S. Trent-Vilim
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Wolfe Snowden Gets Back-to-Back Defense Verdicts Again!
Congratulations to Dean Sitzmann and Steve Ahl for their recent defense verdicts!
Mr. Sitzmann's case involved a 62 year old plaintiff who brought suit after our client ran a red light and struck the driver's side of the plaintiff's pickup truck. Liability for causing the accident was admitted. The plaintiff alleged an injury to his left knee as a result of the accident and ultimately had a left knee replacement. The plaintiff's orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Richard Cimpl, related the knee replacement to the auto accident. Defense's orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Lonnie Mercier, related the knee replacement to the plaintiff's preexisting osteoarthritis. The plaintiff sought $34,000 in medical expenses and no permanent impairment. The jury deliberated for only 42 minutes before returning a defense verdict. Congratulations, Dean!
In Mr. Ahl's case, the plaintiffs alleged the siding subcontractor (our client) and the roofer failed to properly install the siding and roof on their custom-made $600,000 home. Water ultimately penetrated the area behind the siding and mold developed. The plaintiffs sought nearly $250,000 in damages to replace the roof and remediate the mold. During trial, evidence was adduced that the plaintiffs, in an effort to save money, assumed the duties of general contractor after their general contractor was injured on another job. Due to their inexperience, the plaintiffs failed to ensure certain steps were taken to waterproof the home, including caulking around the windows and installing kickout flashing. Although several different consultants and experts advised the plaintiffs to immediately remediate these problems, the plaintiffs waited two and a half years before doing so. The jury determined the plaintiffs were 75% at fault and the court entered judgment accordingly. Congratulations, Steve!
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About the Contributing Authors
Renee A. Eveland joined Wolfe Snowden a s an associate in 2005. She received her B.A. in English (summa cum laude) in 1998 from Northeast Missouri State University, where she was voted Outstanding Graduate in English by her professors. After managing a family-owned jewelry store in Missouri, Renee returned to Nebraska in 2002 to attend the University of Nebraska College of Law. While in law school, she was a member of the Nebraska Moot Court Board. Her practice is primarily in the area of insurance defense. She is a member of the Nebraska State and Lincoln Bar Associations. She is admitted to practice in the state and federal courts of Nebraska.
Daniel R . Slaughter initially joined the firm as a law clerk in 2004. He joined the firm as an associate in 2005. He received his Bachelor of Journalism and Juris Doctor degrees from UNL in 2001 and 2005, respectively. While at UNL College of Law, he served as C l a s s Representative. He practices in the areas of real estate transactions, corporate governance, corporate compliance and copyright law. He is a member of the Nebraska State and American Bar Associations as well as the Lincoln Bar Association. He is admitted to practice in the state and federal courts of Nebraska.
Melanie Whittamore-Mantzios joined Wolfe Snowden as an associate in 2003 after serving as an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Nebraska for 15 years. She received her Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Juris Doctor degrees from UNL in 1985 and 1988, respectively. She practices primarily in the areas of insurance defense, employment law and disciplinary actions against licensed health professionals. She is a member of the Nebraska and Lincoln Bar Associations and the Nebraska Association of Trial Attorneys. She is also an alumnus of the Robert Van Pelt Inns of Court. She is admitted to practice in the state and federal courts of Nebraska.
Jennifer C. Borgerding, a law clerk at Wolfe Snowden, has been with the firm since May 2006. She received a Bachelor of Arts degree (with high distinction) in English and a Bachelor of Journalism degree (with high distinction) in broadcasting from the University of Nebraska, Lincoln in December 1999. After earning a research assistantship, she received a Master of Arts in English from U.N.L. in 2001. Following this, she authored two ninth grade English supplemental handbooks for the UNL Independent Study High School, worked in radio as an announcer for four Lincoln radio stations, and was a part of the English Department faculty for Southeast Community College. She is in her second year of study at the UNL College of Law.
Cathy S. Trent-Vilim joined Wolfe Snowden as an associate in 2002 after serving as a law clerk. She received her Bachelor of Arts degree (cum laude) from Loyola Marymount University in 1994. While working for U.S. Customs at the L.A. Seaport, she received a Master's degree (summa cum laude) in Political Science from Cal State Long Beach, where she was voted Outstanding Graduate Student of the Year. She moved to Nebraska in 1999 to attend UNL College of Law, where she was a member and Executive Editor of the Nebraska Law Review. She practices primarily in the area of insurance defense, business litigation, and appellate advocacy. She is a member of the Nebraska, American and Lincoln Bar Associations as well as the Nebraska Association of Trial Lawyers and Defense Research Institute. She is admitted to practice in the state and federal courts of Nebraska.
